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I. INTRODUCTION
Three years after the earthquake that shattered the Haitian
State and society, the country remains in a fragile condition. Over
357,000 Haitians remain homeless.3 Recovery continues to be sti-
fled by land and ideological disputes, logistical and contracting
problems, and staffing shortages.4 Even the weather has conspired
to hurt the recovery. Resources for recovery are available—and
1. Professor, University of Miami School of Law; J.D., University of Chicago
(1974).
2. Director, Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti; J.D., Georgetown
University (1989).
3. Deborah Sontag, Rebuilding in Haiti Lags After Billions in Post-Quake Aid, N.
Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/24/world/americas/in-
aiding-quake-battered-haiti-lofty-hopes-and-hard-truths.html?ref=deborahsontag&_
r=0. (“When you look at things, you say, ‘Hell, almost three years later, where is the
reconstruction?’” said Miche`le Pierre-Louis, a former prime minister of Haiti. “If you
ask what went right and what went wrong, the answer is, most everything went
wrong.”)
4. Id.
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plentiful. But the primary problem is Haiti’s lack of democratic
institutions—and infrastructure—necessary to facilitate positive
change for the future.5
The closing decades of the twentieth century and the dawn of
the twenty-first century can rightly be characterized as the era of
democracy. Indeed, in the past forty years, a firestorm of democra-
tization spread through most of Latin America and parts of East-
ern Europe.6 It even touched, but just barely, the historically
troubled Caribbean nation of Haiti. During the late 1970s, several
southern European nations abandoned longstanding dictatorships
and adopted democratic regimes. During the early 1980s, most
Latin American nations repudiated their aged military dictator-
ships and instituted democracies. “In the 1990s, another wave of
democratization swept Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,
destroying the so-called ‘Communist Empire.’”7  Today, Haiti,
home to a succession of former dictatorships, still struggles des-
perately to move away from authoritarianism and toward
democracy.
The movement from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones
is often described as the transition to democracy.8 This terminol-
ogy, however, is problematic. It hides a serious ambiguity because
it often refers to several—at least two—different and distinct situ-
ations. One situation is a stage in which a nation is attempting to
adjust norms or institutions so that they comport with the
requirements of the democratic rule of law. In this situation,
nations are in various stages of conforming to these requirements.
But the stability of these institutions has clearly not been secured.
In these stages of development, there are often different levels of
competition between political parties with different ideologies.
There are also differences in the developmental stages of a non-
corrupt, independent judiciary that is capable of enforcing a bill of
rights. A second situation describes the development of liberal
democratic institutions, which may exist in full force, and within a
5. Editorial, Haiti’s Long Road, N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/01/02/ opinion/haitis-long-road.html (“It’s not a problem of
the availability of money but of the capacity to spend it,” said Rafael Ruipe´rez
Palmero, a Spanish development official in Haiti.  However, other parties disagree:
“the flood of aid has slowed to a trickle; much of what was promised was never
delivered or remains undisbursed, or was disbursed but not actually spent. . . . Money
for long-term recovery has proved hard to spend, or slow to show results.”)
6. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN
THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 3 (1993).
7. Irwin Stotzky, Suppressing the Beast, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 883, 883 (1998-99).
8. Id. at 904.
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viable infrastructure.9 Again, their stability is not yet completely
secured. In the second situation, political, social, economic, and
cultural actions and other measures are being taken or have been
taken to achieve a necessary degree of consensus and social adhe-
sion to those institutions.10
No matter which stage of development a nation is in, how-
ever, the transition to democracy remains incomplete and incredi-
bly difficult.11 Other problems exist. The institutional structures of
public life remain underdeveloped and unstable. For example, a
representative legislative branch, a competent judiciary, and an
executive branch that does not go beyond its constitutionally
imposed boundaries, are often ineffective and unripe in securing
democracy.12 The underrepresented majority still lacks access to
the basic necessities that ensure an opportunity for a productive
life. Moreover, the rule of law—and the fundamental guarantees
of due process—must become a basic, accepted requirement of
public life and private social interaction.13 Perhaps even more
important, the corporatist political and social structures must be
attacked and transformed if the vast underprivileged majority has
any hope of gaining access to the basic necessities required for a
dignified life.14 All these factors are needed to reach a satisfactory
level of economic and social development, and to protect the
human rights and democratic process of a developing nation.
The key to Haiti’s future success is trust by the Haitian elite
and the international community in the ability of the Haitian peo-
ple to effect democracy. Yet the only way to institute these formal,
democratic elements is to reorient Haitian society. But this proves
a challenging task. If corporatism controls all aspects of the Hai-
tian state, then democracy cannot exist.15  Instead, a small elite
holds total control.16  Thus, corporatism infects the electoral pro-
cess, business, and the economy. The cleansing process, however,
must involve institutions specifically designed to purge corporat-
ism. At present, these institutions do not exist. This article exam-
ines how to create and maintain the institutions necessary to
fortify Haiti’s democratic future, beginning with a look at corpo-
9. Id. at 883.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 883-84.
12. Id. at 884.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 887.
16. Id. at 888.
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ratism, followed by an analysis of the major institutions that
make a system democratic. Ultimately, this article describes
Haiti’s current challenge of minimizing the negative effects of cor-
poratism while maximizing the democratic process.
II. POLITICS
The difficulties facing Haiti are four-fold: political, social,
legal, and economic. Politics includes building a structure of gov-
ernment that is democratic, where the branches adhere to their
constitutional requirements, and are not overtaken by their corpo-
rate form.  For democracy, a society needs institutions designed
and developed to protect the human rights of the individuals it
serves. Haiti’s political stability is supported by its economic via-
bility; primarily, the challenge of incorporating Haiti into the
global economy. This section addresses the political challenges
Haiti must face and overcome in order to take a more prominent—
and secure—place on the global stage, beginning with a discussion
on the development of democracy, followed by an examination of
Haiti’s constitution and election, and concluding with a conversa-
tion on the role of corporatism in the political reform process.
A. The Constitution and Elections
Fair, inclusive elections that reflect the will of the Haitian
people and a stable, credible government are essential compo-
nents to a sustainable, democratic Haitian state.17 Almost every
election ever held in Haiti has been controversial, and the most
recent, held in November 2010 and March 2011, are no exception.
On November 28, 2010, in the midst of a cholera epidemic and
continued mass displacement after the earthquake, Haiti held the
first round of elections to select a president, a third of the Senate,
and the entire House of Deputies.18 In these elections, the Haitian
people experienced political discrimination in the form of political
17. See INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI ET AL., VIOLATIONS OF
VOTING RIGHTS IN HAITI: ELECTIONS THAT DO NOT REFLECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE,
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW, REPUBLIC OF HAITI, SUBMISSIONS TO THE UN HUMAN
RIGHTS COUNCIL (2011), available at http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/
2011/04/LERN-Compiled-UPR-Submissions1.pdf. [hereinafter VIOLATIONS OF VOTING
RIGHTS].
18. The earthquake left approximately 350,000 people dead, an estimated two
million people homeless in Port-au-Prince alone, and destroyed thousands of
buildings, including most of the landmark buildings in Port-au-Prince. Relief efforts
have done little to help the Haitian people recover from this disaster. See generally
Irwin P. Stotzky, The Truth About Haiti, 26 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010).
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party exclusion and massive disenfranchisement due to failures in
voter registry and fraud during vote tabulation.19 “Despite wide-
spread requests for new elections by [twelve] of the [nineteen]
Presidential candidates, Haitian human rights groups, and civil
society, the international community pressured the Haitian Gov-
ernment into releasing electoral results and proceeding with a sec-
ond round of elections.”20  Even more recent elections have not met
Haiti’s commitments to conduct genuine elections that express the
will of the Haitian people.21 The extralegal Conseil Electorale
Provisoire’s systematic exclusion of eligible political parties—
including Fanmi Lavalas—in elections in April 2009, June 2009,
November 2010 and March 2011, without legal justification, vio-
lated Haiti’s national and international obligations.22  Voices from
across the political spectrum in both Haiti and the United States,
joined by human rights groups, and most importantly, Haitian
voters, warned both the Haitian and U.S. governments in advance
that the deeply flawed elections risked putting the country into
turmoil and endangering the U.S. investment in reconstruction.23
But both the U.S. and Haitian administrations refused to listen.24
The 2011 elections were one of the most important in Haitian
history. Voters chose the entire House of Deputies for a four-year
term, a President with a five-year term, and one-third of the Sen-
ate to serve a six-year term.25 These elected officials bear the
responsibility of guiding Haiti’s reconstruction for at least four
years. This responsibility requires leadership and careful consid-
eration in making many difficult, important decisions whose
results and ramifications will shape the Haitian society for
decades to come.
The legislative elections happened in the absence of fifteen
political parties, including Haiti’s most popular party, Fanmi
19. JOINT REPORT OF INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL MONITORS OF HAITI’S NOVEMBER 28,
2010 ELECTION, RECONSTRUCTING DEMOCRACY 9 (2010), available at http://ijdh.org/
wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Haiti-Joint-Observer-Report-FINAL.pdf.
20. VIOLATIONS OF VOTING RIGHTS, supra note 17, at 6.
21. See id.
22. INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI ET AL., HAITI’S NOVEMBER 28
ELECTIONS: TRYING TO LEGITIMIZE THE ILLEGITIMATE (NOV. 22, 2010), available at
http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Election-Report-11-23-2010.
pdf. Fanmi Lavalas is a political party lead by President Aristide. The party, which
emerged in 1991 and officially formed in 1996, seeks to promote both growth and
equity, espousing social democratic principles.
23. Id. at 1.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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Lavalas.26 Fifteen Presidential candidates were also denied partic-
ipation, and some parties, including Fanmi Lavalas, refused to
even register a Presidential candidate because of the election’s
flaws.27 Fanmi Lavalas’ participation was particularly impor-
tant—the party is by far Haiti’s most popular, and its absence
obviated the questionable legitimacy of the election’s results.28
Fanmi Lavalas has won every election it has contested, including
ninety percent of the seats in the 2000 parliamentary elections.29
This disenfranchisement and denial of party participation threat-
ens Haiti’s electoral legitimacy; simply put, every party that ful-
fills the requirements of Haiti’s Constitution and its electoral laws
should be allowed to participate.
Haiti’s Provisional Electoral Council (“CEP”) never issued a
comprehensive explanation for the exclusions. The exclusion of
presidential candidate and singer Wyclef Jean appeared justified:
the Constitution has a five-year residency requirement in Haiti,
and most documents list Mr. Jean as a resident of Saddle Ridge,
New Jersey.30 But Mr. Jean claims that he did, in fact, file docu-
ments proving his Haitian residency.31 Without a public explana-
tion of the CEP decision, it is hard to dismiss his claims.
In the case of Fanmi Lavalas, the CEP provided a series of
informal explanations for the party’s exclusion—all regarding a
mandate sent by the party’s exiled leader, former President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide—from South Africa last November.32 In fact,
Fanmi Lavalas presented an original mandate, authenticated by a
Haitian notary in compliance with Haitian law.33 President Aris-
tide sent a fax of the mandate directly to the CEP, and confirmed
26. Id.
27. See INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI, supra note 22, at 2.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 8.
30. Gkay, Bergen County Map of the Stars-Saddle River, THE BC-EVERYTHING YOU
WANT TO KNOW ABOUT BERGEN COUNTY (Aug. 23, 2008, 7:43 PM), http://bergencounty
.wordpress.com/2008/08/23/bergen-county-map-of-the-stars-saddle-river/.
31. Damien Cave, Haiti Calm After Jean is Rejected, N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/world/americas/22haiti.html?n=top%2fReference
%2fTimes%20Topics%2fPeople%2fJ%2fJean%2c%20Wyclef&_r=0.
32. The CEP not only lacked a good reason for excluding many candidates and
parties, but also lacked the constitutional legitimacy to do so. The Council was a
Provisional Council hand-picked by Haiti’s President, Rene´ Pre´val, not the
independent Permanent Council required by Haiti’s 1987 Constitution.
33. Brian Concannon, Jr., Haiti’s Flawed Elections: They Told Us So, BOSTON
HAITIAN REPORTER (Nov. 10, 2010), http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/
2013/02/They-Told-Us-So.pdf.
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its authenticity in a radio interview.34
In October 2010, 45 members of the U.S. Congress, most of
them Democrats, wrote then–Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,
warning her that support of flawed elections would “come back to
haunt the international community” by generating unrest and
threatening the implementation of earthquake reconstruction
projects.35 In July 2010, Republican Senator Richard Lugar was
even more direct, warning that “[the] absence of democratically
elected successors could potentially plunge the country into
chaos.”36 In September 2010, over two dozen US-based human
rights, religious, development, and solidarity organizations urged
Secretary Clinton to withhold all aid until a new CEP had been
formed and demonstrated a commitment to fair elections.37
Haitians fought the unfair elections in the streets, in the
press, and at political meetings.38 Political organizations from
across the spectrum—many of whom had agreed on little else for
decades—condemned the CEP’s exclusions.39 Haitian voters had
seen enough electoral charades to recognize one when they saw it,
and interest in the elections was dangerously as low as the elec-
tions’ stakes were dangerously high.40
The previous CEP—with most of the same members as the
2010–11 Council—disqualified Fanmi Lavalas and other parties
from Senate elections held in April and June 2009.41 When the dis-
qualifications were first announced, the United States, the United
Nations, and the Organization of American States disqualified the
sanctions as undemocratic.42 The U.S. government issued a warn-
ing that an exclusion of Fanmi Lavalas would certainly and “inev-
itably” raise questions about the credibility of the electoral
process.43 The CEP, however, did not buckle under the interna-
tional community’s criticism and barred the excluded parties from
34. Id.
35. Brian Concannon, Jr. & Jeena Shah, US Will Pay for Haitian Vote Fraud,
BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/
oped/articles/2010/12/15/us_will_pay_for_haitian_vote_fraud/; see also HAITI: NO
LEADERSHIP—NO ELECTIONS, S. Rep. No. 111-50 (2010).
36. Elections Were Marred Long Before November 28, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND
POLICY RESEARCH, http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/relief-and-reconstruction-
watch/elections-were-marred-long-before-november-28 (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).
37. INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI, supra note 22, at 1.
38. Id. at 9.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 3-4.
41. Id. at 2.
42. Id. at 8.
43. Id.
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the election.44 The international community blinked by not only
accepting the flawed elections, but by paying for them, too: inter-
national donors supplied $12.5 million, or 72 percent of the elec-
tion’s cost.45 Haitian voters, all too familiar with fraud, boycotted
the results.46 While the CEP’s official participation rate of eleven
percent for the April elections was low enough, most observers put
the real participation figure at three to five percent.47
The difficulties in effecting electoral reform are mirrored by
Haiti’s physical, post-quake condition. In order to carry out recon-
struction, the current Haitian government will need to ask its citi-
zens to make sacrifices. People will have to relocate their homes
and businesses, go without water, government services, and food,
and tolerate many inconveniences as the damaged cities are
rebuilt.48 Generally, a government obtains these kinds of sacrifices
in two ways: it develops trust or it uses force. A government
elected by a small fraction of the voters who could choose only
those parties approved by the outgoing government will be hard-
pressed to develop trust.49
If the new Haitian government cannot induce trust, it will
have to obtain its citizens’ cooperation through force. Forcing
large numbers of people to do anything is difficult;50 forcing people
who have nothing to lose and have already suffered as much as
they can bear, will be next to impossible.51 Complicating this
impending chaos is the inefficacy of Haiti’s small and inexperi-
enced police force.52 Thus, enforcing cooperation through force
risks igniting the chaos discussed by Senator Lugar.53 Neither the
Haitian nor United States governments heeded any of these warn-
ings.54 The United States sent $15 million to support the elec-
tions—about half their cost—while the State Department
44. Id. at 3.
45. Brian Concannon Jr., Let Voters, Not Bureaucrats, Decide Elections, BOSTON
HAITIAN REPORTER (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.bostonhaitian.com/columns/2010/let-
voters-not-bureaucrats-decide-elections.
46. INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI, supra note 22, at 1.
47. Id. at 4.
48. Id. at 10.
49. Id.
50. There are 500,000 residents of Internally Displaced Persons camps, for
example. Jason Beaubien, Ordinary Life Resurrected, Slowly, In Haiti, NPR (April 2,
2013, 1:37 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/01/12/145104854/ordinary-life-resurrected-
slowly-in-haiti.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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simultaneously dodged questions about the elections’ flaws at
press conferences.55 The Haitian government closed any discus-
sion of allowing excluded candidates, while the government’s can-
didates ran an apparently well-financed campaign; there seemed
to be more posters for President Pre´val’s INITE coalition than all
other Port-au-Prince parties combined.56
The running of deeply flawed elections conducted with inter-
national support, as exemplified by those held in 2010 and 2011,
has a long history of financial backing from the United States.57
American aid was critical to Haiti’s first free and fair elections in
1990, and to several successful elections since 1994.58  The devel-
opment of an opposition is an essential component of Haiti’s
democracy.  Yet, rather than supporting democratic development,
much of U.S. support for both elections and opposition parties has
been tied to influencing the policies of Haitian officials.59 The sup-
port for elections and for political parties has been closely tied to
the candidates’ willingness to comply with American policy dic-
tates.60  As a result, U.S. electoral support has become divorced
from the effective development of democracy.61
The most obvious form of unhelpful election policy by the U.S.
has been the support of brutal dictatorial regimes that ran sham
elections, such as the Conseil National de Gouvernement in the
1980s, the Francois and Jean-Claude Duvalier dictatorships, and
promoting political candidates who are known human rights viola-
tors like Emmanuel Constant and Prosper Avril. The U.S. has
undermined and co-opted people who do support democracy, but
are not viewed as sufficiently supportive of perceived American
interests. So, the U.S. claims to support democracy while under-
mining it in both obvious and subtle ways. The primary example
is the attempt to isolate and undermine the majority party in
Haiti—the Lavalas party. The U.S. has organized coalitions of
political actors, some of whom possess democratic pasts, and
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Brian Concannon, Jr., Lave Men, Siye Ate: Taking Human Rights Seriously, in
LET HAITI LIVE: UNJUST U.S. POLICIES TOWARDS ITS OLDEST NEIGHBOR 89-90 (Melinda
Miles & Eugenia Charles eds., 2004) [hereinafter Lave Men, Siye At].
58. Id. at 90.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See 09PORTAUPRINCE169, CORE GROUP REPS MEET WITH PREVIAL ON SENATE,
WIKILEAKS.ORG, (APRIL 2, 2013, 4:31 PM), 169, CORE GROUP REPS MEET WITH
PREVAL ON SENATE, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09PORTAUPRINCE
169.html (US Embassy evaluation of President Preval).
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others of whom possess dictatorial pasts. The mere association
with former dictators was itself enough to erode most of the demo-
cratic members’ electoral support.62 But, under U.S. patronage,
the coalitions took increasingly unpopular stands, including sup-
port for the return of the hated army, and class-based attacks
against Lavalas supporters.63
In the 1990s, United States-supported opposition took form in
the Convergence Democratique, or CD. CD parties won a plurality
in the legislature in the 1995 elections, which allowed them to
name the Prime Minister and form the Government.  They also
did well at the local level, winning a majority of mayor’s offices,
and a plurality of local councils.  The most successful of these par-
ties, Organisation Politique Lavalas (OPL) ran on a platform of
eliminating the army and progressive economic and social pro-
grams. The OPL government accepted and adopted the neo-liberal
economic policies favored by the U.S. and the international com-
munity. Such an approach, however, was very unpopular in Haiti.
These policies included lowering tariffs on agricultural goods (now
among the lowest in the world) and privatizing state-owned enter-
prises.64  Those hurt by the policies exercised their newfound dem-
ocratic right to protest, and by June 1997, the protests had become
so widespread that the Government resigned.65
The U.S. International Republican Institute helped create the
Haitian Conference of Political Parties (“CHPP”), a politically
diverse group including former communists, a convicted dictator,
and ultra right-wing Duvalierists. This conference gave birth to
the CD.66 The CHPP included three candidates who had run in the
CNG’s January 1988 elections after the dictatorship had mas-
sacred voters two months before.67
The CHPP evolved over the next eighteen months into the
CD, which included the once-dominant OPL (since renamed
Organisation du Peuple en Lutte).68  Neither of these coalitions
propounded a coherent political platform. As Eugenia Charles,
62. Lave Men, Siye Ate, supra note 57, at 90.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 90-91.
67. The three candidates were Leslie Manigat of the RNDP, who “won” those
elections, Duvalierist Hubert de Ronceray of the MDN, and Gregoire Eugene of
PSCH. See Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. & Nancy Gordon Heinl, WRITTEN IN BLOOD: THE
STORY OF THE HAITIAN PEOPLE 1492–1995 721 (1996).
68. Lave Men, Siye Ate, supra note 57, at 91.
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former Prime Minister of Dominica (and staunch supporter of the
U.S. when it invaded Grenada) and the Caribbean Community’s
(“CARICOM”) Representative to the joint CARICOM/OAS Mission
to Haiti stated, “I had to ask them why they called themselves
‘Convergence.’  They were not converging on anything.  They were
not agreeing on anything.  They cannot get together to form a
plan.”69
The CD did, however, agree on a three-part consensus: first,
the return of the army; second, the purging of the popular Lavalas
party; and third, a renewed commitment to the international com-
munity’s assistance to the Haitian government. The Haitian
majority took an opposing stance on these same issues: hatred of
the army, support of Lavalas, and removing the embargo. The
public believed that the aid embargo was aggravating the severe
poverty of Haiti’s majority and crippling the government’s ability
to develop democratic institutions.70
Support for the CD plummeted as its policies diverged from
the views held by electorate.71 The ruling parties of 1997 garnered
about twelve percent in the 2000 May legislative elections.72 A
U.S.-commissioned Gallup Poll taken after the elections found a
4% credibility rating for the CD leadership, and also that Presi-
dent Aristide had by far the highest credibility rating of any politi-
cian.73  Sixty percent of those polled named Aristide the leader
they trusted most and no one else received more than 4% sup-
port.74  Only 8% named Convergence as the party with whom they
most sympathized.75
Generally, politicians who advocate unpalatable or undemo-
cratic policies simply lose the support of the electorate. Paradoxi-
cally, however, as the CD’s electoral support plummeted, its
international support skyrocketed.76  In 1995, the U.S. sought to
delegitimize the victory of current CD member OPL.  After the
party left the Lavalas movement, the U.S. stepped up its financial
backing.77  Parties in the CD have received increasing funds from
the U.S.: the International Republican Institute alone received $3
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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million per year, primarily to oppose the Lavalas party.78  In 2001,
when the CD refused to participate in an OAS-brokered broad-
based initiative to resolve the electoral crisis, the U.S. converted
the 12% electoral support into a veto by declaring that any solu-
tion to the electoral crisis required CD approval.79  One prominent
Haitian economist and government critic opined that the “official”
opposition “would be a joke if it were not so serious with its U.S.
backers.”80
This kind of foreign interference obviously infuriates Haitian
voters. Imagine how American voters would feel if the same action
occurred on United States soil.81 The anger is more justified in
Haiti, however, because of the consequences suffered by the vast
majority of the population. From the lavish financial contributions
to the brutal and corrupt Duvaliers, to military training during
the 1991–1994 dictatorship, those who have terrorized ordinary
Haitians often did so with help from the international commu-
nity.82 Haitians also know that foreign support means less
accountability to domestic voters.83  They doubt that the CD, if it
succeeds in gaining power through undemocratic means, will exer-
cise it in a democratic way.84
The CD has compounded this distrust by refusing to partici-
pate in any initiatives that risk leading to a test of electoral
strength, and by associating with those trying to overthrow the
government by unconstitutional means.85 The CD has systemati-
cally sabotaged every attempt by the Haitian government, OAS,
and CARICOM to negotiate an end to Haiti’s political crisis.86  It
also supplies more than tacit support to those seeking the violent
overthrow of the elected government.  In November, 2002, former
Haitian army Colonel Himmler Rebu, who led an unsuccessful
attempted coup d’etat in the 1980s, called for a popular uprising
against the government at a rally attended by CD leaders.  He
later became a visible member of the CD leadership.  The CD rep-
resentative in the Dominican Republic was arrested by Dominican
authorities in a border town for plotting an armed attack against
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 92.
82. Id. at 91.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 92-93.
86. Id. at 93.
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the government.  CD leaders voiced support for escaped convict
and convicted killer Jean Tatoune’s violent anti-government
movement in Gonaives.87
The CD eventually collapsed after it achieved its goal: the
ouster of the Lavalas government in the February 29, 2004 coup
d’e´tat. Leading up to the coup, the U.S. government, frustrated
with the CD’s limitations, began supporting other, more aggres-
sive and better-organized organizations, especially the Group of
184.88
Haiti’s 1987 Constitution established the Assemble´s des Sec-
tions Communales (“ASECs”),89 a radically democratic pyramid
structure based on four to six-person local assemblies designed to
decentralize political power and ensure grassroots participation at
the highest levels of government.90 A broad spectrum of Haitian
governments and members of the International Community—
including the United Nations, the Organization of American
States, and the United States—have ignored this foundation of
Haiti’s constitutional system for twenty-five years despite its
effectiveness in fostering stability.91 Since 1987, Haiti has had ten
election cycles, resulting in six Presidents and several legisla-
tures.92 ASECs have been on the ballot less than half the time, and
the system has not been fully implemented once.93
The ASEC system is comprised of numerous tiers and elec-
tions rooted in the local community.94 ASEC candidates run as a
slate, from a political party or group of independents, and are cho-
sen by voters in each communal section. Haiti is divided into ten
Departments. Each Department is divided into municipalities, or
communes, and each municipality is split into communal sec-
tions.95 A dense urban communal section could have more than
100,000 voters. However, a remote rural section might contain
just a few hundred.  ASEC members are the heart and soul of the
constitutional system, even though they wield little direct power
87. Id.
88. See Michel Chossudovsky, US Sponsored Coup d’Etat: The Destabilization of
Haiti, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Feb. 29, 2004), http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-sponsored-
coup-detat-the-destabilization-of-haiti/5323726.
89. 1987 CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE D’HAITI.
90. See Brian Concannon, Jr., Haiti’s Stealth Elections: What’s At Stake?,
HAITIACTION.NET (Dec. 2, 2006), http://haitiaction.net/News/BC/12_2_6/12_2_6.html.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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themselves.96 These voters serve an oversight function in acting as
the system’s “conscience.”97 Additionally, the voters enforce an ele-
ment of fairness into the system by directly selecting accountable
agents such as judges and electoral council members.98
At the local level, each communal section is administered by a
Sectional Council, which is, in turn, supervised by the ASECs. At
the municipal level, the Municipal Assembly, comprised of dele-
gates from each ASEC, serves similar watchdog and advisory
functions. The Assembly hears reports from the mayor on the use
of municipal resources, must approve any sale of state lands, and
provides a candidate pool for local justices of the peace.99
Each Municipal Assembly sends a representative to the
Departmental Assembly.100 The Departmental Assembly chooses
the members of the Departmental Council, which administers the
Department.101 The Departmental Council reports to the Depart-
mental Assembly.102 The Departmental Assembly also composes a
list of nominees for trial and appellate judgeships in the Depart-
ment. Each Departmental Assembly nominates three people to
serve on the national Permanent Electoral Council (“CEP”), creat-
ing a list of 30 nominees. The Supreme Court, the executive, and
the legislature each pick three names from that list for the CEP.
Further, each Departmental Assembly sends a representative to
the Interdepartmental Assembly.103  The Interdepartmental
Assembly assists the executive branch in policy planning.104  The
Interdepartmental Assembly is entitled to attend and vote at Min-
isterial Council meetings that deal with issues within its
domain.105
The ASEC system, in principle, ensures that non-professional
politicians, elected by their neighbors, have a say at every level of
Haitian government. The system is insulated from centralized
money and other forces because it is very difficult to predict which
ASEC candidates are likely to make it to the Departmental
Assemblies, where power starts to accumulate. For example, in
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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the Third Section of Croix-des-Bouquets, outside Haiti’s capitol,
there are seven ASEC slates of six candidates each. If a candi-
date’s slate prevails, he has a one-in-six chance of being chosen for
the Croix-des-Bouquets Municipal Assembly. That Assembly has
ten members, one of which is chosen for the Departmental Assem-
bly for the West Department.  So, any one ASEC candidate has a
1-in-420 chance of reaching the Departmental Assembly, and a 1-
in-4,200 chance of reaching the Interdepartmental Assembly.106
Implementing the ASEC system would bring desperately
needed stability to future elections, namely by establishing a Per-
manent Electoral Council.107 The 1987 Constitution created a
formula for choosing a Provisional Council that would run a single
election to establish the first ASEC structure.108 The ASEC system
was supposed to choose a Permanent Electoral Council after those
first elections, which would then run subsequent elections.109 The
1987 elections ended when paramilitary Tonton Macoutes, with
support from the military government, hacked and shot hundreds
of voters at polling stations.110  As a result, the ASEC system was
never fully implemented.111 Without a full ASEC structure in
place, each of Haiti’s elections over the last twenty-five years has
been run by a Provisional Council.112 All but the first of those
Councils was chosen through a formula not recognized by the Con-
stitution. And all but the first of the elections they ran was con-
tested by the losing parties, who challenged—with good reason—
the Provisional Council’s legitimacy.113
Implementing the ASEC system would also encourage judi-
cial accountability. Most of Haiti’s current judges were nominated
through a process not recognized by the Constitution, led by the
Executive Branch.114 In some cases, the government tried to
approximate the Constitutional system, by consulting with the
legislature on appointments. In other cases, such as Prime Minis-
ter Latortue’s replacement of five Supreme Court justices in 2005,
the executive branch simply installed its henchmen. In all cases,
the judges know that they primarily owe their jobs to the Execu-
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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tive Branch. The ASEC system ensures that judges are chosen, in
part, by the communities they are intended to serve. Systemati-
cally, then, they are encouraged to be more responsive to the com-
munity, and to ensure that their acts are perceived as fair—not
just inside the Ministry of Justice, but on the dusty streets outside
their courtroom too.
Although twenty-five years may seem too attenuated to lay
the Constitution’s cornerstones, the importance of their existence
outweighs their late arrival. There must be diligent implementa-
tion of the entire ASEC system. By doing so, President Martelly
could help end the incessant series of electoral crises in Haiti,
which keep spiraling into political instability and twice have led to
the overthrow of the Constitutional government.
B. Corporatism
In addition to these challenges,115 Haiti faces other obstacles
in the transition to democracy. Another prominent feature of the
consolidation process is the failure to fulfill the requirements of
the rule of law in both the formal and informal aspects of public
and private life. This failure manifests itself in the concentration
of power solely in the executive branch of government, leading to
massive human rights abuses, and a total disregard for the func-
tions of other branches of government, corruption in public and
private economic activities, non-observance of efficient economic
norms, and non-compliance with the most basic rules of social life,
such as elementary traffic regulations.116 The failure to follow the
rule of law also leads to the stunting of economic and social devel-
opment. These features adversely affect the opportunities for dem-
ocratic changes.
One of the other main obstacles nations face in the transition
process when attempting to create, solidify, and consolidate demo-
cratic institutions is corporatism.117 “Indeed, for the transition pro-
115. Haiti faces other seemingly insurmountable obstacles. In Haiti, like Latin
America, the process of democratization has often taken place during the worst
economic, social, and political crises in the history of these various nations. In
general, these crises include the commission of massive human rights violations
(murder, torture, rape), enormous external debts, hyperinflation, epidemics, the
collapse of entire systems of social welfare, and extremely high rates of
unemployment.
116. For more information on the relation between the rule of law and Due Process
in Haiti, see generally Irwin P. Stotzky, The Truth About Haiti, 26 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1
(2010).
117. Stotzky, supra note 7, at 885. Parts of this essay dealing with corporatism and
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cess to succeed, the people must dissolve the network of de facto
power relationships, which, in some nations, corporations create
and jealously protect by taking advantage of the power vacuum
left by representatives of popular sovereignty.”118 In other nations,
such as Haiti, where there has never been a democratic system of
governance until very recently, these corporative power relation-
ships have developed for a variety of peculiar historical and cul-
tural reasons.119 Under the umbrella of authoritarian rule, a
number of social groups representing particular interests sculpt a
place for themselves after a bargaining process that includes their
support for the present regime. Such groups include the military,
religious organizations, coalitions of entrepreneurs, trade unions,
and sometimes even the so-called independent press. Once demo-
cratic rule is established, of course, these groups stubbornly resist
relinquishing their power to the representatives of the people.120
The concept of corporatism has been the source of much con-
fusion and specious theoretical differences. The problem arises
from two distinct meanings attributed to the word, one more
traditional and the other more technical. In the more traditional
sense, corporatism refers to the control exercised by the state over
organizations and interest groups. A prime example is the control
that prevailed in Hitler’s Germany. The more technical meaning,
and the one commonly used in the political arena, attempts to
describe the supposedly opposite phenomenon: where these same
organizations and interest groups acquire considerable influence
over and exert persistent pressure against government decision
makers. While defining the concept explicitly in this way tends to
lead to more emphasis on one meaning to the exclusion of the
other, the term actually encompasses both meanings when
applied to most nations undergoing the transition process, includ-
ing Haiti.121
That is not the whole of the matter. Haitian corporatism does
not rise to the level of the fascist institutional structure of legally
sanctioned exclusive organizations or interest groups.122 But
democracy are based on previous writings by Irwin Stotzky, including Suppressing
the Beast, The Truth About Haiti, and many others.
118. Irwin P. Stotzky, Democracy and International Military Intervention: The Case
of Haiti, in DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA 125, 152 (Richard S.
Hillman et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN
AMERICA].
119. Stotzky, supra note 7, at 885.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 885-86.
122. Id. at 885.
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neither does it reduce itself to the pressures that interest groups
apply on political entities in every pluralistic society, for example,
when these groups lobby for or against legislative acts that may
affect them.123 The Haitian reality is considerably more complex.124
It includes, among others, both features mentioned above: there is
some control by the State over interest groups and organizations,
and there are a variety of official and unofficial mechanisms that
are used to alter their operation. Simultaneously, however, those
organizations exert enormous pressure upon government actors
and agencies. This pressure allows the corporative forces to obtain
favored treatment of various kinds.125
Some of these privileges even amount to a legal monopoly of
the interests represented in a way that approaches the fascist
scheme.126  In many circumstances, however, the monopoly power
of the corporative interests is unaccompanied by any significant
influence of the State over these interest groups and organiza-
tions. In other situations, alternative legal or even constitutional
privileges short of monopoly may be granted that shield the organ-
ization from the raw competitive forces of popular expression,
such as a “free market.” In addition, there are informal ways that
governments may grant favors that in some cases amount to ille-
gal, indeed, corrupt actions.127
C. Deliberative Democracy
The best means for countering this corporative power is to
create a polity governed by universal and impersonal principles
where individual citizens, who are not identified with any particu-
lar interests but preserve the capacity of adopting different ones,
make choices in a process of public justification and dialogue. In
practical terms, this requires broad popular participation in gov-
ernmental decision making and its consequent actions led by
strong participative and ideologically committed political parties
and parliamentary bodies. These parties and parliaments must
themselves, of course, be internally democratic, open, and
disciplined.128
These conclusions are based on a particular vision of democ-
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Stotzky, supra note 7, at 886.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 890.
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racy and upon the utmost respect for the autonomy of each indi-
vidual. In this view, autonomy consists of the exercise of self-
governing capacities, such as the capacities of understanding,
imagining, reasoning, valuing, and desiring.129 Free persons have,
and are recognized as having such capacities. In a political order
dedicated to serving the conditions of free deliberation for its
members, those members can legitimately expect of that order
that it not only permit, but also encourage the exercise of such
capacities—that it permit and encourage autonomy. Indeed, one
of the hallmarks of liberal democracy is the notion of the citizen,
who is not identified with any interest, but is free to choose and
has an equal voice in expressing his choice.130
This ideal of the autonomous individual as a paradigm for
democracy is based on a theory that rejects the view that democ-
racy is simply a conglomeration of interested individuals and
groups working in conjunction with the economy or merely a
mechanism for replacing elites. Democracy has elsewhere been
explained as a regimented mode of the practice of moral discourse
by which we try to solve conflicts in the light of universal, general,
and public principles that would be accepted in ideal conditions of
impartiality, rationality, and knowledge.131  This, the argument
goes, makes democracy morally superior to other systems of gov-
ernment. Democracy substitutes simple majoritarian decision for
the requirement of a unanimous consensus in the common and
non-regimented practice of moral discourse. But this is not com-
pletely sufficient. This substitution weakens the force of the pre-
scription that the result of the procedure is morally valid because
it would have been accepted under ideal conditions (given the
functional equivalence between unanimity and impartiality). Nev-
ertheless, democracy preserves some epistemological value
because the need to justify one’s decision to others and to get as
much support as possible for one’s position generates a tendency
toward impartiality which makes it more reliable than other deci-
sion processes, such as individual reflection.132
This epistemic view of democracy presupposes that individu-
als, who are basically moral persons, are its natural agents and
that the freedom and equality of their intervention in the demo-
cratic process should be preserved and expanded. This is, of
129. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 118, at 115.
130. Stotzky, supra note 7, at 890.
131. See generally Stotzky, supra note 7.
132. Id. at 891.
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course, not the case when corporations control the polity and
assume the role of intermediaries. Moreover, this conception of
democracy as a substitute for moral discourse presupposes that
the primary objects of decision in the democratic process are not
crude interests, but principles that legitimize a certain balance of
interests from an impartial point of view. While it is possible that
discourse may have its genesis in crude interests, for those inter-
ests to garner majority agreement, advocates must win support
and justify their positions. Thus, the dialogue requires partici-
pants to reach for principals beyond their crude interests—they
must reach for principles from an impartial point of view. In addi-
tion, dialogue respects and fosters autonomy. It follows, therefore,
that corporations that agglutinate people around common inter-
ests and not around moral values about how to deal with common
interests cannot be protagonists of the democratic process.133
Corporative entities in transitional societies maintain and
even increase their power whenever democracy departs substan-
tially from the strictures of the original practice of moral dis-
course. When this occurs, public debate becomes restricted and
debased, the power of participants actually to influence people
becomes too unequal, and participation of interested people
becomes narrower and weaker. Thus, in order to strengthen the
democratic power of common citizens against that of corporations,
it is crucial to broaden and deepen popular participation in discus-
sion and decision-making.
Furthermore, the mechanisms of representation, necessary in
large and complex societies, are prone to be subverted by corpora-
tive power. This subversion can be caused by several factors.
There is the possibility of corruption of the representatives, their
indifference or even antipathy toward the people they represent
when opposed by corporations, and the apathy of the people repre-
sented. For those reasons, it is essential to broaden the avenues of
direct participation by the people whose interests are at issue.
This is, of course, a difficult task. Nevertheless, it is possible to do
this through general procedures like referenda or popular consul-
tations or through decentralized decisions that allow the con-
cerned people to participate directly.
Moreover, the vision of democracy as a dialogic process con-
cerned with moral principles to regulate conflicts allows us to
qualify the liberal rejection of any intermediary between the indi-
133. Id.
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vidual and the State. Indeed, in a large, complex society, some
institutions must protect the individual against the awesome
power of corporatism. The most likely candidates are political par-
ties, but only when they are the standard for or represent the
basis of fundamental principles of political morality. They are
indispensable in a modern and large society, not only because they
nurture those principles in professional politicians, who purport to
put them into practice if duly elected, but also because they
exempt individuals from justifying their votes before each other on
the basis of principles. In this view, it is sufficient to vote for a
party which organizes its programs on the basis of public, general,
and impartial principles. The deterioration of the role of political
parties in favor of corporations occurs when the significance of
Parliament, the national arena for these parties, is severely
eroded. Unfortunately, the integrity of Parliament is often dimin-
ished by corporative forces in the transition process. Corporations
prefer to exert pressures and achieve agreements in the private
offices of government rather than in the contentious, pluralistic,
and more public parliamentary corridors. In addition, there is the
tendency of administrations to preserve some of the practices
inherited from previous authoritarian governments.
Strengthening political parties and the parliamentary institu-
tions in order to protect the democratic system against corporative
power, however, will work only to the extent that these institu-
tions do not become transformed into corporations themselves.
Unfortunately, this often occurs, particularly when parties
weaken their ideological commitment, do not promote debates on
essential questions of public morality, block channels of participa-
tion, operate through methods of patronage and clientelism, or
resort to personalism and caudillism. If this happens, these par-
ties and parliaments tend to develop elites with distinctive inter-
ests who are likely to become aligned with members of traditional
corporative groups in a manner inimical to democratic principles.
This also causes other dangerous distortions. When parties
become corporations, parliament becomes weakened by the lack of
views held by different representatives, by a discourse that is both
ideologically vacuous and detached from the experiences and
interests of the people represented, and by a general appearance
of opacity and self-service.
To alleviate or even avoid this danger, political parties and
Parliament must be substantially strengthened. This can be
achieved by opening the parties to broad popular participation,
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promoting permanent political debates within them, perfecting
internal democratic mechanisms for selecting party leaders and
candidates, and giving a public accounting of the reasons for sig-
nificant actions, such as how funds are to be managed. It is also
important that the electoral system combine the need for promot-
ing party cohesion and ideological identity with the need for the
voter to identify with individual representatives, rather than vot-
ing for the party slate. A mixed electoral system incorporating
proportional representation with individual candidate selection
may satisfy both needs. This concept can be extended to parlia-
mentary procedures, which should combine party discipline with a
degree of autonomy for individual representatives.
III. SOCIETY
Haiti provides an excellent illustration of the problems that
corporative power poses to nations attempting to move from
authoritarianism to democracy. It is clear that there is a long,
hard distance still to be traveled by the Haitian people in order to
fulfill the underlying conditions of the epistemic value of democ-
racy and to overcome corporatism. Under the dictatorships, the
levels of material satisfaction were so low, the opportunities for
informed debate so debased, the institutional structure so dys-
functional to democratic values, human rights violations so ubiq-
uitous, and the problems of the consolidation of democracy so
intense, that any hope of creating the conditions for a deliberative
democracy appeared to be impossible. Stated otherwise, the dis-
tance between the ideal model and the reality of Haitian life
seemed to suggest that democracy could never become a reality in
Haiti. But there are other serious problems that confront the crea-
tion of a viable democracy in Haiti.
Haiti’s instability and outsize vulnerability to natural and
human disasters may cause one to lament Mother Nature’s seem-
ing obsession with inflicting suffering on the Haitian people.  In
2008, four tropical cyclones slammed Haiti, dumping heavy rains
that led to severe flooding. In January 2010, Haiti was rocked by
an earthquake deemed “the largest urban natural catastrophe in
recorded history.”134  Then, while the country was still reeling from
the damage caused by the earthquake, cholera broke out north of
Port-au-Prince in late 2010.  Placing the blame on Mother Nature,
134. Haiti: Six Months After, UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS [OCHA] (July 12, 2010), http://ochaonline.un.org/tabid/
6412/language/en-US/Default.aspx.
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however, obscures the fact that while the events themselves might
be natural, the devastating damage resulting from the disasters
are anything but.  These three disasters are discussed below to
illustrate how a failure to develop basic government capacity has
made Haiti disproportionately vulnerable.  Developing Haitian
government capacity should be prioritized to ensure a long-term
reduction in vulnerability.135
A. Storms, Flooding and Socioeconomic Rights
Haiti has a recent history of deadly storms and flooding that
have led to widespread loss of life and costly damage.  In 2004,
tropical storm Jeanne swept over Haiti, causing major flooding
and 2,500 deaths.  Jeanne hit Puerto Rico, the Dominican Repub-
lic, Barbados and the United States as a full hurricane, killing
thirty-four people in all those places combined.  When Jeanne
struck Haiti, she was only a tropical storm; yet, she killed over
200 people.136  In 2008, Haiti was again battered—in one season
alone, four hurricane-strength storms killed 793 people, left 310
missing, and another 593 injured.137  The hurricanes destroyed
22,702 homes and damaged another 84,625.138 About 800,000 peo-
ple were affected.139 The floods wiped out 70 percent of Haiti’s
crops, resulting in dozens of deaths of children due to malnutrition
in the months following the storms. Damage was estimated at
over $1 billion, amounting to over 5% of the country’s GDP.140
The recent devastation suffered from hurricanes is not a
result of Haiti’s location in a particularly unfortunate storm
path;141 surprisingly, only six major Category 3 and stronger hur-
135. Brian Concannon Jr. & Beatrice Lindstrom, Cheaper, Better, Longer-Lasting:
A Rights Based Approach to Disaster Response in Haiti, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1146,
1159-60 (2011) [hereinafter Cheaper, Better, Longer-Lasting].
136. Annie Dell & Brian Concannon, Haiti’s Unnatural Disasters, INSTITUTE FOR
JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI (March 28, 2013, 9:17 AM), http://ijdh.org/archives/
15306.
137. HAITI – STORM FACT SHEET #5 (FY) 2009, US Agency for International
Development, available at http://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-storms-fact-sheet-5-
fy-2009.
138. Jeffrey Masters, Hurricanes and Haiti: A Tragic History, WEATHER
UNDERGROUND (March 28, 2013, 10:15 AM), http://www.wunderground.com/
hurricane/haiti.asp [hereinafter Hurricanes and Haiti].
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. In fact, Haiti has a relatively protected location. Caribbean cyclones
generally move from east to west, and Haiti is the western one third of the island of
Hispaniola. The mass of the Dominican Republic, especially its high mountains,
weakens storms before they reach Haiti.
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ricanes have struck Haiti since 1851.142  Rather, it is a result of
government inadequacies and human-made rights violations that
make Haiti disproportionately vulnerable to flooding and damage
resulting thereof.143  Deforestation has over time reduced Haiti’s
ability to withstand heavy rains, making it extremely vulnerable
to flooding.144  Deforestation is in turn a result of the inability of
Haiti’s poor to enforce basic economic and social rights.  A major-
ity of Haitians depend on wood and charcoal as their primary fuel
source, as the high cost of oil and other alternative fuel sources
are prohibitive.145  In addition to serving cooking needs, cutting
down and selling trees provides an alternative source of income
for mountain farmers to buy food and other basic necessities.  But
heavy deforestation has denuded mountain slopes, allowing rain-
water to wash down unimpeded.  The farmers know better than
the experts what happens when rain hits a deforested slope,
because it rushes away with the topsoil that is needed for next
year’s crop and is many farmers’ only legacy for their children.146
However, legacies and next year’s crop mean nothing when the
children are dying today, so the farmer cuts and sells the tree to
buy today’s medicine and food.147
In 1980, Haiti still had 25 percent of its forests, allowing the
nation to withstand events bringing heavy rainfall, like 1979’s
Category Three Hurricane David, without loss of life.148  But as of
2004, only 1.4 percent of Haiti’s forests remained, making Haiti
one of the most deforested countries in the world.149  Storms
Jeanne and Gordon were merely strong tropical storms when they
stuck Haiti, but the almost total lack of tree cover contributed to
the devastating floods that killed thousands. A storm need not
even meet the tropical storm threshold to devastate the nation: in
May, 2004, three days of heavy rains from a tropical disturbance
delivered more than eighteen inches of rain in the mountains,
triggering floods that killed over 2,600 people.150
142. Id.
143. INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
6 (Oct. 13, 2011), available at http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/
Final_UPR-Environment_English.pdf.
144. Id. at 7.
145. Brian Concannon, Another Unnatural Disaster, BOSTON HAITIAN REPORTER
(Oct. 2008).
146. Cheaper, Better, Longer-Lasting, supra note 135, at 1161.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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The failure of the Haitian Government to protect even the
most fundamental rights necessary for survival is thus directly
connected with the problem of relying on non-existent forests to
help meet economic needs and the resulting vulnerability to flood-
ing. Under international law, the Government of Haiti is under
legal obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to food, and
to ensure that it is economically accessible.151  Article 25 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees a human
being’s right to food and freedom from hunger.152  The right is also
articulated in CEDAW153 and the CRC,154 to which Haiti is a party.
Furthermore, Article 12 of the Protocol of San Salvador and Arti-
cle 11 of the American Declaration both recognize the right to
food.155  The right was subsequently codified in Article 11 of the
ICESCR.156 Haiti has signed, but not ratified this treaty, and has
therefore agreed not to take actions that defeat the “object and
purpose” of the ICESCR.157  Nevertheless, the ESCR Committee
has established that a minimum core of economic, social, and cul-
tural rights are customary international law and are thus binding
on all States, regardless of whether they have signed or ratified
treaties protecting those rights.158
151. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ARISING IN THE IMPLEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: GENERAL COMMENT 12, ¶ 7,
(1999), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G99/420/12/PDF/
G9942012.pdf? OpenElement.
152. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1948), art. 25, available at http://
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b1udhr.htm.
153. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WOMEN (1979), art. 12(2), available at www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/
econvention.htm#article12.
154. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD (1990), art. 24(2)(C), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx.
155. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS “PROTOCOL OF SAN
SALVADOR” (1988), art. 12, available at www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/basic5.Prot.
SnSalv.htm.
156. This encompasses two separate but related norms: the right to adequate food
and the right to be free from hunger, see INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL (1966), art. 11, available at www.un-documents.net/icescr.htm
157. With respect to donor states’ obligations, many of the donors operating in
Haiti have signed and ratified the ICESCR, and thus are bound by the obligations
contained therein.
158. CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, NYU SCHOOL OF LAW ET AL.,
RIGHT TO FOOD, WATER AND SANITATION, UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW, REPUBLIC OF
HAITI 71 (2011) available at http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/
LERN-Compiled-UPR-Submissions1.pdf [hereinafter RIGHT TO FOOD] (citing ESCR
Committee, Concluding Comments (Israel), E/C.12/1/Add.90 (May 23, 2003), ¶ 31
(“basic economic, social and cultural rights, as part of the minimum standards of
human rights, are guaranteed under customary international law”); CTR. FOR HUMAN
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Violations of the right to food are not the responsibility of the
Haitian Government alone, however.  In the 1980s, Haiti’s agri-
cultural sector fully met the food needs of its population and pro-
duced national income from exporting agricultural produce.159 The
agricultural sector collapsed, however, after the International
Monetary Fund required Haiti to decrease subsidies on domestic
rice and remove tariffs on imported rice and other staples.160  In
1995, the United States pressured Haiti to drastically reduce tar-
iffs on agricultural imports and slashed tariffs that had previously
been between forty-five to fifty percent to between zero to fifteen
percent.161  Former President Bill Clinton later stated that this
was a mistake that only benefited farmers in the U.S.162  Without
protection for Haitian products, subsidized U.S. agricultural
imports flooded Haitian markets, and Haitian farmers could not
compete.  Today, Haiti suffers from a food deficit and is highly
dependent on foreign sources such as imports and aid to meet its
food needs.163 Difficulties in meeting basic food needs have contrib-
uted to and compounded hardships stemming from the deforesta-
tion problem.
International trade policies have thus contributed to Haiti’s
vulnerability, in violation of countries’ “extranational obligations”
to respect, protect, and facilitate the right to food.164 International
RTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE ET AL., WOCH NAN SOLEY: THE DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO WATER
27 (2008) available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/groups/public/@nyu_law_
website__alumni/documents/documents/ecm_pro_067267.pdf [hereinafter WOCH NAN
SOLEY].
159. Beverly Bell, Miami Rice: The Business of Disaster in Haiti, HUFFINGTON POST,
(Dec. 9, 2010, 3:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/beverly-bell/miami-rice-the-
business-o_b_794504.html.
160. Bill Quigley, The US Role in Haiti’s Food Crisis, http://www.counterpunch.org/
Quigley 04212008.html.
161. Id. at 11-12; Nathanial Gronewold, Post-Quake Revitalization Plans Collide in
Haiti’s Breadbasket, GREENWIRE, Mar. 8, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
gwire/2010/03/08/08greenwire-post-quake-revitalization-plans-collide-in-hai-15994
.html.
162. Bill Clinton, Statement to the US Foreign Relations Committee, March 10,
2010; see also Center for Economic and Policy Research, Bill Clinton Apologizes for
Past Rice Policies, Mar. 22, 2010. http://www.cepr.net/index.php/relief-and-
reconstruction-watch/bill-clinton-apologizes-for-past-rice-policies/.
163. WFP Director appeals for more aid to Haiti on his visit to the country, WORLD
FOOD PROGRAMME, http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/wfp-director-appeals-more-
aid-haiti-his-visit-country.
164. COSOC, UN CHR, Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Food in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2002/25, 59th
Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/54 ¶ 35 (Jan. 10, 2003) (prepared by Jean Zielger),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/554221922d46153bc
1256991004a440b/b005b3e26d66059cc1256cda00512541/$FILE/G0311070.pdf; see
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aid has also been a culprit for destabilizing Haiti’s food market
ultimately hindering long-term access to food. A 2010 report by
the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice & Human Rights focus-
ing on the impact of U.S. food aid on access to food in Haiti found
that food aid can be harmful to the sustainability and availability
of local food for purchase, interfering with the realization of Hai-
tians’ human rights and long-term economic stability.  In particu-
lar, when foreign-grown food is either distributed for free or sold
at a subsidized price, such aid may make it difficult for local food
producers to compete with the imported food.165 At times, it has
also led farmers to abandon agricultural production because it is
no longer lucrative. Former UN chief humanitarian officer John
Holmes stressed that “[a] combination of food aid [and] cheap
imports have . . . resulted in a lack of investment in Haitian farm-
ing, and that has to be reversed.”166 International cooperation in
Haiti must seek to address violations of the right to food in order
to deal with the root causes of flooding disasters.
B. The January 12 Earthquake and the Right to
Housing
While the tremors that crumbled much of Haiti’s central
infrastructure on January 12, 2010 were a natural phenomenon,
the disproportionate consequences of the earthquake were also a
direct result of policy choices and a failure to enforce the law. In
the aftermath of the earthquake, the Haitian Government noted
that the toll did not result from the tremor alone, but from “an
excessively dense population, a lack of adequate building stan-
dards, the disastrous state of the environment, disorganized land
use, and an unbalanced division of economic activity.”167  Decades
of national and international policies and the weakness of the rule
of law created a vulnerability of Haitians that resulted in astro-
nomical displacement and death tolls that far exceed the mortality
also Smita Narula, The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable Under
International Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 691, 725 (2006).
165. See generally TIMOTHY T. SCHWARTZ, TRAVESTY IN HAITI: A TRUE ACCOUNT OF
CHRISTIAN MISSIONS, ORPHANAGES, FRAUD, FOOD AID AND DRUG TRAFFICKING (2008).
166. With cheap food imports, Haiti can’t feed itself, NBCNEWS.COM (March 21,
2010, 7:41 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35967561/ns/world_news-americas/,
(quoting Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief
Coordinator John Holmes in an interview with the Associated Press).
167. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI, ACTION PLAN FOR NATIONAL
RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT OF HAITI 5 (March 2010), available at http://
www.interaction.org/sites/default/files/Haiti%20Action%20Plan%20%28English%20
version%29.pdf [hereinafter HAITI ACTION PLAN].
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in earthquakes of comparable scale in other countries.168
A majority of Haitians live in overpopulated urban centers,
shantytowns, or under-developed villages that fail to meet mini-
mum standards of habitability and security.169  Housing conditions
in Haiti are directly linked to the conditions of extreme poverty.170
Before the earthquake, an estimated eighty percent of the popula-
tion was formally unemployed, and most people eked out a meager
living as manual laborers or service providers in the underground
economy.171  Few Haitians could afford to own a home, so the
majority lived in structurally unsound rental units or informal
settlements on open land.172
After the agricultural sector collapsed in the 1980s, overpopu-
lation exacerbated an urban housing shortage. Farmers who lost
their livelihoods after U.S. agricultural goods flooded Haitian
markets migrated to Port-au-Prince in search of employment.173
Concentration in cities was also an explicit USAID policy to pro-
mote assembly manufacture. The city, once home to 250,000 peo-
ple, grew to 3 million.174  Construction proceeded without regard
for building codes or safety standards, and poor urban planning
resulted in neighborhoods being established in areas prone to
flooding and other natural hazards, including steep hillsides that
collapsed in the earthquake.  Following an assessment in 2009,
UN officials concluded that the Haitian government had lost the
capacity to manage metropolitan Port-au-Prince.175
168. See e.g. WALTER KAELIN, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, HUMAN RIGHTS OF INTERNALLY
DISPLACED PERSONS IN HAITI: MEMORANDUM BASED ON A WORKING VISIT TO PORT-AU-
PRINCE ¶ 7 (12–16 October 2010), available at http://ijdh.org/ wordpress/wp-content/
uploads/2010/11/Kalin-Statement-2010-Haiti-English.pdf (Not least due to urban
planning deficiencies, the earthquake wreaked such enormous destruction).
169. CAMP BENEDICTION ET AL., REPUBLIC OF HAITI, SUBMISSION TO THE UNITED
NATIONS, UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW 1 (2011), available at http://lib.ohchr.org/
HRBodies/UPR/Documents/session12/HT/JS7-JointSubmission7-eng.pdf.
170. Cheaper, Better, Longer-Lasting, supra note 135, at 1161-65.
171. KAELIN, supra note 168, at 1–3.
172. Cheaper, Better, Longer-Lasting, supra note 135, at 1161-65.
173. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD ET AL., SUBMISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS PERIODIC REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE
NEGATIVE IMPACT OF US FOREIGN POLICY ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN COLUMBIA, HAITI AND
PUERTO RICO 6 (Nov. 3–Dec. 22, 2010), available at http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/
default/files/foreign_policy_joint_report_usa_0.pdf.org/sites/default/files/declaration-
treaty/Foreign_Policy_Joint_Report_USA.pdf; Kaelin, supra note 168, at 6.
174. Jane Moyo, Building for the Future: Homes and Security in Haiti, ACTIONAID 6
(2011), available at http://www.actionaid.it/sites/files/actionaid/haiti_-_building_for_
the_future.pdf.
175. See generally UNITED NATIONS HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME (UN-
HABITAT), STRATEGIC CITYWIDE SPATIAL PLANNING: A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS OF
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The earthquake struck less than one year later, killing up to
350,000 people. It displaced an additional two million, few of
whom had the resources to secure alternative housing outside the
affected area.176  Most of these people were killed when crushed by
crumbling buildings, a result of decades of building with poor
materials and non-enforcement of building codes. The quake dis-
proportionately impacted the poor by destroying buildings in
lower middle class neighborhoods and poor neighborhoods con-
structed in ravine areas.177  The impact of poverty and unsafe
housing on death tolls is magnified when Haiti’s mortality is com-
pared to that of other countries shaken by quakes of a similar or
greater scale.  In comparison, prosperous Chile was struck by an
earthquake in February 2010 that was about 500 times more pow-
erful than the 7.0 magnitude convulsion in Haiti, but claimed less
than 600 lives.178 Japan’s 2011 earthquake registered a 9.0 magni-
tude exponentially stronger than even Chile’s, but relatively few
people seem to have perished from the tremor itself, thanks to
Japan’s famed emergency preparedness and construction stan-
dards.179 By heightening building quality and code compliance,
Haiti can protect both the longevity of its physical infrastructure
and the safety of its citizens.
C. The Cholera Epidemic and the Right to Water180
Ten months after the earthquake left over a million people to
survive in precarious sanitation situations, cholera broke out in
central Haiti.181 For cholera, a disease that is waterborne and kills
by dehydration, access to clean water is imperative to both pre-
vention and treatment. Cholera represents a grave and continuing
threat to the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons still liv-
ing in camps that often lack access to clean water and toilets and
to the majority of Haitians that live in rural areas far from water
METROPOLITAN PORT-AU-PRINCE, Haiti (2010) (prepared by ˚Asa Forsman), available at
http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID =3021.
176. Moyo, supra note 174, at 3.
177. KAELIN, supra note 168, at 7.
178. Cheaper, Better, Longer-Lasting, supra note 135, at 1167.
179. Id. at 1166-67.
180. Parts of this essay appear, in somewhat different form and with the
permission of the author, in Brian Concannon, Cheaper, Better, Longer-Lasting, supra
note 135.
181. See generally Dr. Alejando Cravioto et al., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
PANEL OF EXPERTS ON THE CHOLERA OUTBREAK IN HAITI, UN.ORG 18 (2011), available
at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/haiti/UN-cholera-report-final.pdf.
\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\44-1\IAL106.txt unknown Seq: 30  5-NOV-13 12:31
30 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1
infrastructure, hospitals and clinics.182
The source of the epidemic has been traced back to the
Artibonite River, a critical water source for much of central
Haiti.183  Residents of the region rely on the river for bathing,
washing, drinking, and irrigation.184  The river was contaminated
by fecal matter introduced from a UN peacekeeping base seated at
a tributary to the Artibonite River.185 By February 2012, over
7,000 people had died from cholera and 500,000 cases had been
recorded.186 The cholera outbreak is only the most recent and
urgent symptom of a larger and ongoing violation of the right to
water in Haiti.  Despite rigorous public awareness campaigns
seeking to educate people on the need to drink treated water, chol-
era spread largely because of a lack of access to treated or potable
water.187 “Studies conducted in 2006 found that only 55.2 percent
of the population has access to an improved water source, while
close to 70 percent does not have direct access to potable water.”188
182. Associated Press, Cholera Surge in Haiti is Feared, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/world/americas/05haiti.html?src=UN&feedurl=
http%3A%2F%2Fjson8.nytimes.com%2Fpages%2Fworld%2Famericas%2Findex.
jsonp (reporting concerns that the cholera outbreak was surging again, after a
slowing down of new cases in January 2011).
183. Cravioto et al., supra note 181.
184. Cheaper, Better, Longer-Lasting, supra note 135, at 1167-68.
185. In May 2011, a UN-commissioned panel of experts released the results of an
independent investigation, which found that the evidence “overwhelmingly supports
the conclusion that the source of the Haiti cholera outbreak was due to contamination
of the Meye Tributary of the Artibonite River with a pathogenic strain of current
South Asian type Vibrio cholerae as a result of human activity.” Cravioto et al., supra
note 181, at 4.
186. See Haiti Cholera Situation Report #35, UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (Feb. 4, 2010), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/
resources/9731123E8EA209C28525782D0056B8D6-Full_report.pdf.
187. See Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Q&A: Dr. Paul Farmer and Ophelia Dahl on
Recovery Efforts in Haiti, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2011, 8:35 AM), http://latimesblogs
.latimes.com/lanow/2011/01/haiti-cholera-earthquake-dr-paul-farmer-ophelia-dahl
.html (“You can spend half your resources telling people to wash their hands or drink
clean water, but if they don’t have access to clean water, it’s a peculiarly noxious way
of approaching the problem . . . .”);  see also Beatrice Lindstrom, Law in the Time of
Cholera: Violations of the Right to Water in Haiti, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 21,
2011, 11:42 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/beatrice-lindstrom/law-in-the-time-
of-choler_b_812170.html.
188. RIGHT TO FOOD, supra note 158, at 71 (citing World Bank, Project Appraisal
Document on a Proposed Grant In the Amount of SDR 3.4 Million (US$5 Million
Equivalent) to the Republic of Haiti for a Rural Water and Sanitation Project, World
Bank Report No: 38080, 28, available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/
default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/01/05/000020953_20070105093521/
Rendered/PDF/38080.pdf; La vulne´rabilite´ en Haı¨ti: Che´min ine´vitable vers la
pauvrete´? Rapport national sur le de´veloppement humain – Haı¨ti 74 (2004) (DHS
study)).
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These figures almost definitely overstate access to improved water
sources because public systems are highly dysfunctional and in
some communities rarely available year round.189  As the World
Bank has reported, “[i]n almost all urban areas water supply is
intermittent,”190 and in rural areas, water is very difficult to access
during the dry season.191
As with food, however, the responsibility for the failure to
respect the right to clean water does not lie with the Haitian Gov-
ernment alone.  “In 1998, the Haitian government had the oppor-
tunity and commitment to make drastic improvements to its
water supply system when the Inter-American Development Bank
(“IDB”) approved a $54 million loan aimed to improve potable
water and sanitation services.”192  The IDB estimated that the loan
would decrease water costs for the poor by up to ninety percent.
On the eve of its dispersal, however, the United States blocked the
loan.  Internal communications obtained under the US Freedom of
Information Act revealed that the interference was motivated by a
policy designed to limit support for Haiti’s democratically elected
president Jean-Bertrand Aristide because of his left-wing policies
that were seen as contrary to US interests in the region.  Such
political considerations are in direct violation of the IDB’s Articles
of Agreement, but with significant voting power, the United
States succeeded in stopping the loan dispersal, significantly
undermining the opportunity for the Haitian government to
develop the water infrastructure.193
The cholera outbreak itself is also evidence of the need of the
international community to adhere to human rights in their assis-
tance and interventions in Haiti.  A report issued by a UN-com-
missioned panel of experts found that the cholera pathogen was
introduced in fecal matter that likely leaked from a UN base with
a negligently maintained sanitation system with broken pipes car-
rying “significant risk for . . . contamination.”194  The report found
189. RIGHT TO FOOD, supra note 158, at 77.
190. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant In the Amount
of SDR 3.4 Million (US$5 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Haiti for a Rural
Water and Sanitation Project, WORLD BANK REPORT NO: 38080, 28 [hereinafter World
Bank Appraisal], available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDS
ContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/01/05/000020953_20070105093521/Rendered/PDF/380
80.pdf
191. RIGHT TO FOOD, supra note 158, at 77; Cheaper, Better, Longer-Lasting, supra
note 135, at 168-69.
192. Cheaper, Better, Longer-Lasting, supra note 135, at 169.
193. WOCH NAN SOLEY, supra note 158, at 13.
194. Cravioto et al., supra note 181, at 21.
\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\44-1\IAL106.txt unknown Seq: 32  5-NOV-13 12:31
32 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1
that “the sanitation conditions at the Mirebalais MINUSTAH
camp were not sufficient to prevent contamination of the Meye
Tributary System with human fecal waste.  It is clear that . . .
there was potential for feces to enter into and flow from the drain-
age canal running through the camp directly into the southwest-
ern branch of the Meye Tributary System.”195 The UN’s negligent
waste management in an environment already vulnerable to
waterborne disease has led to an arbitrary deprivation of life for
thousands of Haitians, and amounts to a gross violation of human
rights in itself.196
IV. THE COLLECTIVE SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Weaknesses in Haiti’s justice system are both a cause of the
destruction of the 2010 earthquake, and a significant obstacle to
Haiti’s recovery.197 Haiti’s zoning regulations are inadequate, but
had they been enforced, the majority of people who died in the
earthquake would not have perished inside their homes in slums
perched on steep hillsides.198 Had Haiti’s weak building codes been
enforced, many of the houses that fell would have stayed standing.
Yet this physical illustration is only the surface of the problem—
Haiti’s legal system is problematic to its core. This section reveals
the systematic and practical problems with Haiti’s legal system,
and recommends reforms to ensure its future viability and ability
to produce quality administrators of justice.
A. A System Plagued with Problems
Most of Haiti’s governments have been dictatorships, and the
justice system evolved to suit the governments.199  Everything
about the system, from the way that judges are paid, the language
spoken, the keeping of case files and the training of lawyers, has
evolved to serve the people holding both guns and money. The sys-
195. Id. at 23.
196. Cheaper, Better, Longer-Lasting, supra note 135, at 1169-70.
197. See Henri E. Cauvin, Haitian Earthquake Upends Country’s Criminal Justice
System, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/02/06/AR2010020602047.html.
198. See Tom Watkins, Problems With Haiti building standards outlined,
CNN.COM (Jan. 13, 2010, 10:23 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/01/
13/haiti.construction/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD.
199. See e.g., Kwesi Sansculotte & Matayo Moshi, The Haitian Timeline: A History
of Military Dictatorship and Civil Rule (Revised and Expanded), COUNCIL ON
HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (Feb. 9, 2010), http:// www.coha.org/military-dictatorship-in-
haiti/.
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tem prevents the majority of Haitians who are poor from vindicat-
ing their rights through the formal justice system, which
reinforces their exclusion from the formal economy and the politi-
cal system.
Haiti’s justice system is to a large extent privatized. Judges
are paid a small salary each year, lesser officials much less, and
many courts lack basic legal materials like law books and paper.200
Courts compensate for public disinvestment by charging high
court fees for almost every legal action, and by the frequent bribes
to judges, prosecutors and court officials. Legal proceedings are
theatrical and formalistic, with little attention paid to the presen-
tation or analysis of facts.  They are conducted in French, which
most Haitians, especially the poor, do not understand. Because
many cases are decided for reasons other than their factual or
legal merits, rigorous preparation is not deemed important. For-
malism and shoddy practice also serve to obscure the true bases
for decisions.
The legal system’s historical exclusion of Haiti’s majority and
its deep technical deficiencies make it incapable of functioning
under a democracy without a fundamental overhaul.  Change
needs to be made in practices, but also in people and structures.
Personnel throughout the system need to be trained to perform at
a higher level than before, and to perform in a way that respects
the rights and interests of the majority of Haitians who are poor.
B. A Legal Training Process in Need of Reform
The Haitian justice system’s exclusion of the poor is guaran-
teed by the exclusion from the legal profession of lawyers willing
and able to work with Haiti’s poor. Many students enter law
school intending to use the law to force fundamental reforms in
the legal system and society at large. But the vast majority of stu-
dents who complete their law school coursework—some estimate
up to eighty percent—never become members of the bar because
they are unable to complete the two post-graduation require-
ments, preparation of a “me´moire de sortie,” or master’s thesis,
and a two-year apprenticeship, or “stage” with a licensed lawyer.201
200. See Alex Braden et al., The Independence of the Judiciary in Haiti under the
Interim Government (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Center for
International Legal Education, University of Pittsburgh School of Law), available at
http://www.ijdh.org/pdf/humanrightsreport6-19-06.pdf.
201. Marisol Floren Romero, Update: Researching Haitian Law, GLOBALEX (Feb.
2012), available at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Haiti1.htm.
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Both the stage and the me´moire serve as numerical and ideo-
logical filters, preventing progressive students from becoming pro-
gressive lawyers. Both also miss opportunities to properly train
law school graduates. Law school in Haiti is theoretical, with no
practice classes or clinics.202 So the me´moire and stage, in princi-
ple, afford an opportunity for practical experience and the devel-
opment of expertise in the chosen area.203  But in practice they
serve merely to produce lawyers who practice like the lawyers who
trained them.204
The me´moire is a substantial paper—often over 100 pages
long—and support for its completion is not integrated into the law
school curriculum. The Haitian education system, shackled by low
public investment and political upheaval, is by far the worst in the
Americas.205  As a result, even bright, hard-working students grad-
uate from law school without learning the basic writing skills that
the me´moire requires. Further, the graduate must find the time to
research and write the thesis. By the time most students finish
law school, they are in their mid-to-late twenties, have a family
and need to work full time. Few can afford a computer, and most
have only intermittent electricity at their home.
A law graduate must find a lawyer willing to act as “parrain”
or “godfather,” someone who advises on research, writing, and the-
sis defense, and must usually pay for this service.206 Law gradu-
ates who do manage to find the time, the resources and a
godfather are usually steered to subjects that the godfather con-
siders important, and in which he or she is an expert. Those paths
almost never involve challenging the existing legal or social struc-
tures supporting both the unequal system and its lawyers. As a
result, less than 25% of graduates ever clear the me´moire hurdle.
The stage is the largest squandered opportunity to prepare
public interest lawyers. Practical training replicates the habits of
the practitioner, which in Haiti means someone neither ideologi-
cally nor professionally qualified to prepare high-quality human
rights cases challenging structural injustice. As lawyers in Haiti
have always sided with those able to pay or intimidate them, there
202. Brian Concannon, Jr., The Bureau des Avocats Internationaux, a Victim-
Centered Approach, in EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS ( David
Barnhizer ed., 2001) [hereinafter Bureau des Avocats].
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Education Program, HOPEFORHAITI.COM, http://hopeforhaiti.com/Education
.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
206. Bureau des Avocats, supra note 202.
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are few people who can—and will—train young lawyers to cross
the line to assert the rights of the poor or powerless.  The exper-
ienced lawyers’ own emphasis on procedure and theater at the
expense of the presentation and analysis of facts precludes them
from being able to train a stagiaire (apprentice) in the rigorous
preparation of a case.207
V. REFORMS
While Haiti, Eastern European, and Latin American nations
strive toward democracy, it is clear that experimentation is in
order, particularly in the political and economic spheres. The over-
riding characteristic of the political and economic life in develop-
ing nations is the desire to avoid either a national-populist or a
neo-liberal project. In today’s economy, neither approach seems
promising.
The import-substituting, protectionist style of industrializa-
tion and the pseudo-Keynesian public finance of a nationalist-pop-
ulist approach seem unable to deal effectively with the huge
problems facing these nations. Neoliberalism is unable to service
the real conditions of sustained economic growth. Neoliberalism’s
rise to the status of religious doctrine is due in part to the influ-
ence of the United States.208 The Reagan Administration pushed
pro-business austerity programs and set the tone for a worldwide
reduction of government’s role.209 But neoliberalism is also a
response to the failure of a national-populist approach. Indeed,
Haiti still faces the problems of possible economic stagnation cre-
ated by the monopolization of basic industries by the elite, by the
international community, and by a somewhat closed economy.210
What is needed now, however, is to fix neoliberalism’s major
flaw—chiefly that it does not help the vast, poor majority live a
dignified life. Instead, corporative power creates wealth for a
small minority, while almost enslaving the majority. Indeed, if
governments do not spread the benefits of globalization, countries
will remain divided between a very small group of ultra-rich busi-
nessmen and a large group of marginalized people.
Unlike neoliberalism’s claim that government should play a
207. Id.
208. David M. Kotz, Globalization and Neoliberalism, in 12 RETHINKING MARXISM 1
(2002), available at http://people.umass.edu/dmkotz/Glob_and_NL_02.pdf.
209. Stotzky, supra note 7, at 903.
210. Haiti: Economy, GLOBALEDGE (last visited Mar. 29, 2013), https://globaledge
.msu.edu/ countries/haiti/economy.
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minor role in the economy,211 real democratic change requires gov-
ernment to play an important role. At a minimum, Haiti must
pursue locally-designed policies to draw the poor into the global
economy. To do this, these governments must pursue a rather dif-
ferent vision of a political economy than the one traditionally
accepted.
To begin with, Haiti must approach macro-economic stabiliza-
tion seriously. The government must impose taxes upon the privi-
leged to allow for public investment in people and infrastructure.
One possibility would be to impose a direct, consumption-based
tax, taxing the difference between income and savings, as a way to
finance the state and promote capital formation and productive
investment.
There must be a major push to train the poor majority in a
variety of skills needed in the global economy. Education is cen-
tral to reform. This approach would also suggest attempting joint
public-private ownership of enterprises and encouraging decen-
tralized capital allocation and management. If the breakdown of
corporative control of the economy is to succeed, however, the
strict requirements of capitalism must be imposed. Thus, the pri-
vate sector must actually be privatized, allowing for real competi-
tion. This requires laws opening the market so that everyone can
compete on a level playing field. In addition, it is necessary to
develop publically-held companies and impose upon them the
requirements of competition and independent financial responsi-
bility. Parliament must pass laws which encourage such activity.
On the political front, there must be an ability to counter the
threat of oligarchic control of political power. There must be a
facility for the rapid resolution of major political impasses through
granting priority to programmatic legislation, liberal resort to
plebiscites and referenda, and perhaps the vesting of power in the
executive and legislative branches to call for new elections in the
face of serious disagreements over the direction the country
should take.
This is not all. Measures must be taken to broaden the scope
and heighten the level of political mobilization in society. As dis-
cussed above, this requires strengthening the role of political par-
ties, public financing of campaigns, increased free access to radio
and television, and the breakup of the broadcasting cartel. Politi-
cal organizing, at all levels, must be encouraged through specific
211. Kotz, supra note 208, at 7.
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government programs. Direct democracy must be systematically
organized and planned.
VI. CONCLUSION
Regarding corporatism, the formal creation or reestablish-
ment of democratic rule is not sufficient to destroy the corporative
power relationships built up during the dictatorship periods.
Indeed, these citadels of power are insidious.212
Incorporating the formerly excluded majority into the deci-
sion-making process will start to strengthen the workings of
democracy against the corporative power that has crippled Haiti’s
past. Direct popular participation is key to creating and imple-
menting effective government action. To create a true democracy,
mechanisms of representation must be perfected. Further, politi-
cal parties must be strengthened and internally democratic and
open, disciplined, and ideologically defined.213  Furthermore, a via-
ble and vigorous justice system legitimate enough to prosecute
and punish those who have committed massive human rights vio-
lations is essential to democratic reform. These reforms, however,
still face substantial obstacles.
Political reform alone is not sufficient to foster the blooming
of democracy. Creative attempts at economic and social reform are
also necessary, and must work concurrently with the necessary
political reform. Direct popular participation must reach all
aspects of public and private life. Because old methods have not
transformed Haitian society to allow individual citizens the free-
dom and dignity due to each human being, experimentation is
called for and essential to the creation of a viable democratic
future.214
212. Stotzky, supra note 7, at 905.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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